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Judicial Power and The Rules
Enabling Act
by Linda S. Mullenix"
I.
Congress undermines and erodes judicial power when it imperially
declares and exercises an exclusive right to enact federal procedural
rules.' Thus, congressional intrusion into federal procedural rulemaking is the most significant contemporary issue of judicial independence.!
* Visiting Professor, Harvard Law School (1994-95). The City College of New York
(BA. 1971); Columbia University (M. Phil., 1974; Ph.D., 1977); Georgetown University
(J.D., 1980). The author served as Co-Reporter and legal counsel to the Civil Justice
Advisory Group ofthe United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. See
CIVIL JUSTICE REFORu ACT ADVISORY GROUP OF THE U.S. DisT. CouRT FOR THE SOUTHERN
DIST. oF TEx., REPORT AND PLAN (Oct. 18, 1991). The opinions expressed in this response
are the author's and do not reflect the views, opinions, or conclusions of the Advisory Group
or the judges ofthe Southern District of Texas. In addition, the author served as a Judicial
Fellow during 1989-90 at the Federal Judicial Center and in that capacity attended
meetings of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules and the Judicial Conference of the
United States. See Hope Over Experience: MandatoryInformal Discovery andthe Politics
of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REV. 795 (1991). Similarly, the opinions expressed in this
response do not reflect the views, opinions or conclusions of the Federal Judicial Center.
Copyright 0 1995 by Mercer Law Review and Linda S. Mullenix. No portion of this
Article may be reproduced without permission of the Author.
1. See Linda S. Mullenix, The Counter-Reformationin ProceduralJustice, 77 MINN. L.
REV. 375, 382 (1992) and Linda S. Mullenix, UnconstitutionalRulemaking: The Civil
Justice Reform Act and Separationof Powers, 77 MINN. L. REv. 1283, 1287 (1993). Most
points in this response are discussed at length in these two articles.
2. The ascendancy of a functionalist approach to separation-of-powers issues has
yielded a series of cases consistently upholding congressional legislative initiatives as not
encroaching on Article III prerogatives. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comn'n v.
Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986) (upholding authority of Commodity Futures Trading
Commission to promulgate regulations under the Commodity Exchange Act and to exercise
jurisdiction over common law counterclaims); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988)
(upholding constitutionality of independent counsel provisions ofEthics in Government Act
against Article III separation ofpowers challenge); and Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S.
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The proper province of procedural rulemaking is no mere pointillist
academic quibble, but rather an issue that runs to the core of judicial
power. A judiciary that cannot create its own procedural rules is not an
independent judiciary Moreover, a judiciary that constitutionally and
statutorily is entitled to create its own procedural rules, but must
perform that function under a constant cloud of congressional meddling
and supercession, is truly a subservient, non-independent branch.
While Professor Redish grounds his views of judicial independence in
a theory of majoritarian constitutional theory, it is important to
ask-with regard to procedural rulemaking-whether (and in what
sense) the federal judiciary is constitutionally or statutorily subordinate
to Congress, or, if not, whether the judicial rulemakers are nonetheless
required to act as if they were an elected branch of government. There
should be no quarrel with the proposition that Congress as the
legislative branch ought to be responsive to majoritarian concerns in
enacting substantive law, or that the federal courts in performing their
judicial function may serve as a counter-majoritarian check on substantive overreaching. But it is a far cry from endorsing these propositions
to imposing a majoritarian requirement on the judiciary itself in its
procedural rulemaking role. T imply that constitutional government
requires this seems a peculiar and dangerous distortion of constitutional
theory.
For almost fifty years after the enactment of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure,' the allocation of procedural rulemaking authority was
largely a somnambulant issue.4 No one questioned the federal judiciary's power or authority to promulgate and amend federal procedural
rules, and the rare constitutional challenge to specific procedural rules
merely asked whether the judiciary had exceeded its powers by enacting
a substantive rule in the guise of a procedural one."
361 (1989) (upholding provisions ofthe Sentencing Reform Act against separation of powers
and non-delegation challenges). But see Northern Pipeline. Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe
Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (invalidating provisions of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 as
violating separation of powers doctrine). Hence, the trend of the late 1980s has been one
accommodating interbranch power-sharing.
3. See generally FED. R. CIV. P.
4. See Linda S. Mullenix, Hope Over Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery and
the Politicsof Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REV. 795, 798-99 (1991).
5. See Mullenix, UnconstitutionalRulemaking, supra note 1, at 1327-28 n.218 (citing
Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enters., Ill S. Ct. 922,933-35 (1991)
(Rule 11)); Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149,162-63 (1973) (Rule 48); Hanna v. Plumer, 380
U.S. 460,464-65 (Rule 4(dXl)) (federal service of process); Schlagenhaufv. Holder, 379 U.S.
104, 112-14 (1964) (Rule 35(a)); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 433-35
(1956) (Rule 54(b)); Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 445 (1946)
(Rule 4(f)); Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941) (Rule 35).
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In every single case in the Erie-Sibbach-Hannaline, the Supreme
Court has never once found that the federal judiciary transgressed its
rulemaking authority in promulgating or amending a federal civil rule.'
If nothing else, this famous case* line stands as a jurisprudential
monument to the conclusion that the judicial branch, at least, knows its
place in the constitutional scheme. The Erie-Sibbach-Hannacase line
also stands as testament to the proposition that the federal judiciary
understands the difference between substantive and procedural
rulemaking, in light of the limits set forth in the Rules Enabling Act.7
Moreover, throughout the entire Erie-Sibbach-Hannaera, no litigant has
ever challenged the fundamental premise that the federal judiciary has
procedural rulemaking power, but rather whether the specific exercise
of that power contravened the Rules Enabling Act.'
Judicial rulemaking was a truly soporific issue until the early 1980s,
when Congress unexpectedly began to flex its legislative muscle in the
procedural rulemaking arena.' With the amendment of the Rules
Enabling Act in 1988 and the public opening of judicial advisory
committee meetings, the practical business of the judicial rulemaking
bodies has changed significantly. What once had resembled a scholarly,
deliberative enterprise now has many of the hallmarks of a congressional
committee legislative mark-up. 10 But apart from this new-fashioned

6. See id.
7. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1994), which states in pertinent part:
(a) The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules of
practice and procedure and rules ofevidence for cases in the United States district
courts (including proceedings before magistrates thereof) and courts of appeals.
(b) Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right. All
laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after such
rules have taken effect.
28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1994).
8. See cases and authority cited supra note 5.
9. See Mullenix, Hope Over Experience, supra note 4, at 798-800.
10. See, e4g., Griffin B. Bell, et al., Automatic Disclosure in Discovery-The Rush to
Refbrm, 27 GA. L. REV. 1 (1992); Alfred W. Cortese, Jr. & Kathleen L. Blaner, A Change
in the Rules Draws FireLitigatorsFight to Stop Manditory Disclosure,NAT'L L.J., Oct. 18,
1993, at 25 (col. 4) (opposition to proposed Advisory Committee discovery rules amendments and efforts to override proposals in Congress); John C. Koski, MandatoryDisclosure:
The New Rule That's Meant to Simplify Litigation Could Do Just the Opposite, 80 A.B.A.
J. 85 (Feb. 1994); Ann Pelham, JudgesMake Quite a Discovery: LitigatorsErupt,Kill Plan
to Reform Civil Rules, LEGAL TIMES, March 16,1992, at 1; Ann Pelham, ForcingLitigants
to Share: Judges Back Radical Discovery Rule, But Lawyers Want a Veto From the Hill,
LEGAL TIMES, May 3,1993, at 1; Ann Pelham, Panel Flips, OKs Discovery Reform, LEGAL
TIMEs, April 20,1992 at 6; Randall Samborn, Derailingthe Rules Unusual Coalition Tries
Last-Ditch Effort To Halt Civil Discovery Reform, NATL L.J., May 24, 1993, at 1 (Col. 1)
(congressional efforts to override Advisory Committee's proposed rule changes); Randall
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rulemaking-in-the-political-trenches, these practical changes also have
been accompanied by the emergence of a full-blown constitutional debate
on rulemaking power."
The debate over rulemaking authority is important in light of what
can only be charitably characterized as Congress's arrogant, heavyhanded usurpation of procedural rulemaking authority in the last
decade.' Congress has directly or indirectly asserted an increasingly
active role in the procedural rulemaking process, consequently enfeebling
federal courts in their ability to govern their internal affairs. This
encroachment has advanced on two fronts.
First, the traditional rulemaking process of the Advisory Committee
on Civil Rules basically has been converted into an open forum for public
lobbying on rules changes." What once was a deliberative judicial

Samborn, Bill To Stop Change Dies New Discovery Rules Take Effect, NATL L.J., Dec. 6,
1993 at 3 (col. 1) (failure of congressional efforts to alter discovery rules); Lawyers for Civil
Justice Ad Hoc Committee on Procedural Reform, FederalRule 26 Amendments: Wrong
Medicine for Discovery Problems, 58 DEF. COUN. J. 454 (Oct. 1991).
11. Cf Alfred W. Cortese, Jr. & Kathleen L. Blaner, Podium: Should CongressDecide
Civil Rules? Yes: Give and Take is Healthy, NATL L.J., Nov. 22, 1993 at 15 (col. 1)
(arguing Congress should be free to enact federal civil rules) with Linda S. Mullenix,
Podium: Should Congress Decide Civil Rules? No: Not a Subject to Wheel In Deal, NAT'L
L.J., Nov. 22, 1993 at 15 (col. 3) (arguing contra). See generally Paul D. Carrington, The
New Order in JudicialRulemaking, 75 JUDICATURE 161 (1991); David C. Weiner, Lawyers
Seek More Input in DraftingFederalRules, NATL L.J., Aug. 8, 1994 (discussing proposal
of ABA Section on Litigation to request more lawyers on judicial rulemaking committees,
with reference to Rules Enabling Act and Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990); Stephen C.
Yeazell, The MisunderstoodConsequencesofModern Civil Procedure,1994 WIS. L. REV. 631
(1994); Symposium, Reinventing Civil Litigation: EvaluatingProposals for Change, 59
BsOOK L. REV. 655 (1993).
12. See Mullenix, The Counter-Reformationin ProceduralJustice,supra note 1, at 37985,407-11,424-40; Mullenix, UnconstitutionalRulemaking,supranote 1, at 1286-88,131438.
13. This is the result of an amendment to the Rules Enabling Act in 1988. See 28
U.S.C.A. §§ 2072-2074 (1989) and 28 U.S.C. § 2073(c)(1)-(2), (d). These subsections provide:
(cXl) Each meeting for the transaction of business under this chapter by any
committee appointed under this section shall be open to the public, except when
the committee so meeting, in open session and with a majority present,
determines that it is in the public interest that all or part of the remainder of the
meeting on that day shall be dosed to the public, and states the reason for so
closing the meeting. Minutes of each meeting for the transaction of business
under this chapter shall be maintained by the committee and made available to
the public, except that any portion of such minutes, relating to a closed meeting
and made available to the public, may contain such deletions as may be necessary
to avoid frustrating the purposes of closing the meeting.
(2) Any meeting for the transaction of business under this chapter, by a
committee appointed under this section, shall be preceded by sufficient notice to
enable all interested persons to attend.
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function has been transformed into a mini-legislative process, inducing
some judicial committee members to behave uncomfortably more like
elected representatives than independent, life-tenured judges.14
Consequently, judicial advisory committees now work under the
intimidation of having their recommendations substantially undone by
disappointed suitors who either threaten to (or actually) take their
rulemaking petitions to Congress.'
Apart from the impact of congressional intervention in the usual
procedural rulemaking processes (either before, during, or after judicial
rulemaking), Congress more significantly preempted judicial rulemaking
in its enactment of the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 ("CJRA"),16 the
most sweeping procedural rule reform since promulgation of the federal
rules in 1938." As to congressional authority for this legislative
venture into procedural rulemaking, the Act represents a highly
sophisticated exercise in legislative double-speak, denominating itself as
something other than what it actually is, in order to support a dubious
constitutional claim to exclusive procedural rulemaking authority.
In support of this legislative venture, Congress asserted both an
exclusive right to promulgate federal procedural rules' s while simulta(d) In making a recommendation under this section or under section 2072, the
body making that recommendation shall provide a proposed rule, an explanatory
note on the rule, and a written report explaining the body's action, including any
minority or other separate views.
Id. See generallyMullenix, Hope Over Experience,supranote 3, at 799-800 (discussing the
new open-forum provisions of the Rules Enabling Act) and Mullenix, Unconstitutional
Rulemaking, supra note 1, at 1331-32 (discussing the 1988 amendments to the Rules
Enabling Act).
14. See generally Pelham, JudgesMake Quitea Discovery, supranote 10; Pelham, Panel
Flips, supra note 10; Pelham, Forcing Litigants to Share, supra note 10; Samborn,
Derailingthe Rules, supra note 10; Samborn, New Discovery Rules, supra note 10.
15. Id.
16. Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, §§ 101-105,104 Stat. 5089-98
(1990) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (Supp. II 1990)).
17. See generallyJoseph R. Biden, Jr.,Equal,Accessible, Affordable Justice Under Law:
The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 1 CORNELL J. LAW PUB. POL 1 (1992); Carl Tobias,
Civil Justice Reform and the Balkanization of FederalCivil Procedure,24 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
1393 (1992); D. Jeffrey Campbell & Jonathan R. Kuhlman, Civil Justice Reform Act of
1990: An Experiment Gone Awry, 60 DEF. COUNS. J. 17 (1993); Carl Tobias, Recalibrating
the Civil Justice Reform Act 30 HAPv. J. ON LISos. 115 (1993); Mullenix, The CounterReformation in Procedural Justice, supra note 1; Yeazell, supra note 11; see also
Symposium, Reinventing Civil Litigation; Evaluatingthe Proposalsfor Change,supra note
11.
18. See S. Rep. No. 416, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 13, at 9-12 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.CA.N. 6802, 6811-15. See also Mullenix, The Counter-Reformationin Procedural
Justice, supra note 1, at 424-32; Mullenix, UnconstitutionalRulemaking, supranote 1, at
1326.
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neously maintaining that the Act was a legitimate exercise of its
substantive and delegative lawmaking power. 9 Whatever theory-and
Congress was not especially fussy about which one applied-Congress
was determined to foist its own vision of procedural reform on all ninetyfour federal district courts. Hence, the CJRA actually was a congressional-procedural-rulemaking wolf in substantive-lawmaking sheep's
clothes. And if the CJRA was not a disguised rulemaking wolf, then it
was a rulemaking Trojan-horse. With enactment of the CJRA, Congress
rolled this monumental legislation up to the gates of the federal
judiciary and the judicial kingdom--suitably impressed-took this
monstrosity within its walls (with varying degrees of caution or
celebration).
With the CJRA Trojan-horse safely inside the judicial fortress, it may
now be too late to salvage either the practical or theoretical consequences of this disturbing incursion on interbranch power. It seems a bit late
to be debating the scope and limits of judicial power and independence
when the federal judiciary has largely capitulated, with only muted
objection,2° to Congress's conclusory fiats on rulemaking power. It is
sad, indeed, if recent events have largely mooted the issue of rulemaking
authority, or rendered this a mere academic issue.
II.
In this theoretical debate over the allocation of procedural rulemaking authority, Professor Redish surely cannot be faulted as a judicial
apologist. With the exception of salary diminution, life-tenure, and
"decisional" and "counter-majoritarian" independence,"' Professor

19. See S. Rep. No. 416, at 9, reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6812; see also Mullenix,
The Counter-Reformation, supra note 1, at 426-28.
20. See Mullenix, The Counter-Reformation, supra note 1, at 411-18 (discussing the
belated and subdued criticisms of the Judicial Conference on the then-pending Civil Justice

Reform Act).
21. See Martin H. Redish, FederalJudicialIndependence: Constitutionaland Political
Perspectives,46 MERCER L. REv. 697 (1995) thereinafter Redish]. Many of the theoretical
themes Professor Radish employs in his analysis of judicial independence have been
explicated at length in his other writings. See, eg., MARTIN H. REDISH, THE FEDERAL
COURTS IN THE POLITICAL ORDER: JUDICIAL JURISDICTION AND AMERICAN POLITICAL
THEORY (1991); MARTIN REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF

JUDICIAL POWER (2d ed. 1990); Martin H. Redish, SeparationofPowers,JudicialAuthority,
and the Scope of Article III: The Troubling Cases of Morrison and Mistretta,39 DEPAUL
L. REV. 299 (1990); Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence
and the Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455 (1986). See also Erwin
"Chemerinsky, The Seduction of Deduction: The Allure of and Problems with a Deductive
Approach to Federal Court Jurisdiction,86 Nw. U. L. REv. 96 (1991) (book review) and
Charles Silver, American Political Theory Considered,60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 562 (1992)
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Redish endorses very little else as attributes of independent judicial
power. As to issues concerning concurrent interbranch authority, such
as procedural rulemaking (or what he labels more generally as
"lawmaking authority"),' Professor Redish consistently favors legislative power over judicial authority, based on his theory of the ascendancy
of majoritarian principles.
The problem with Professor Redish's conclusions about the proper
allocation of procedural rulemaking authority is that they only partially
comport with constitutional and statutory law. Professor Redish makes
scant reference to the actual historical experience of procedural
rulemaking by the federal judiciary,' and when he does he glosses over
important distinctions between substantive lawmaking and procedural

(book review).
22. See Redish, supra note 21, at 699. Professor Redish defines judicial "lawmaking"
independence as referring -to the ability of the federal courts to create either controlling
substantive legal principles or governing generalize roles[sic] of procedure in the course of
individualized adjudications, free from interference by the other branches of federal
government." Id. This is a somewhat odd way of characterizing the judiciary's procedural
rulemaking function and surely by this language Professor Redish does not mean to imply
that the judiciary creates procedural rules in" or "during" the course of individualized

adjudications.
Professor Redish later defines judicial lawmaking independence as concerning "ajudge's
ability to fashion generalized substantive rules of decision or rules of procedure that are
designed to govern not only the case before her but similarly situated cases as well." See
Redish, supranote 21, at 707. But federal judges do not create ad hoc procedural rules for
individual cases except as existing federal rules of civil procedure both permit and direct
the court to do so. Thus, judges fashion procedural rules to govern the cases before them
only under the authority of such federal rules as Rule 16(c)(12) (allowing the court to adopt
special procedures for managing potentially difficult or protracted actions that may involve
complex issues, multiple parties, difficult legal questions, or unusual proof problems); or
16(e) (providing for judicial issuance of a pretrial order controlling "the subsequent course
of the action"). Federal judges also may fashion the procedural conduct of an action
pursuant to authority vested by local rule under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 83.
Federal judges also are able to fashion procedural rules for future actions through the
rulemaking power vested in the Rules Enabling Act. See supra note 7. See generally The
Rulemaking Function and the Judicial Conference of the United States, 21 F.R.D. 117
(1968); Thomas E. Baker, Symposium, An Introduction to Federal Court Rulemaking
Procedure,22 TEX TECH. L. REV. 323 (1991); Winifred R. Brown, FEDEAL RULEmANG:
PROBLEMS AND POSSIBILrTES 1-34 (1981); Howard Lesnick, The Federal Rule.Making
Process: A Time for Re-examination, 61 A.B.
J. 579 (1975); Judge Albert B. Maria,
FederalProceduralRulemaking: The Programof the Judicial Conference, 47 A.B.A. J. 772
(1961); Mullenix, Hope Ouer Experience, supra note 3, at 797-802; Jack B. Weinstein,
REFORM OF THE COURT RULE-MAmNG PROCEDUREs 55-63 (1977); Russell R. Wheeler,
Broadening Participationin the Courts Through Rule-Making and Administration, 62
JUDICATURE 280 (1979).

23.

See id.

740

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

rulemaking 24 Furthermore, his policy justifications for favoring
congressional authority are largely based on conclusory assertions of
Congress's "significant and legitimate interests,4 without any balanced vision of equally legitimate judicial-branch concerns. Finally,
Professor Redish's analysis ignores or diminishes at least two crucial

dimensions of the rulemaking debate: (1)the requirements of the Rules
Enabling Act,O and (2) the inherent powers of the federal courts.
Having said this, there certainly is much to commend in his analysis
of judicial authority. The taxonomy of four conceptual categories of
judicial independence is useful in organizing the domain of judicial
power, especially since many federal courts, casebooks, and constitutional law treatises lack such organizational structure.S Beyond supplying
a useful analytical tool, Professor Redish's categorization helps
distinguish among obvious, trivial, and vital questions of interbranch
power.
For example, questions relating to "institutional" independence hardly
seem worth belaboring,'S although fully one-third of Professor Redish's

24. See, e.g., Radish, supranote 21, at 699: "While decisional and counter-majoritarian
independence are essential as matters of both American political theory and constitutional
directive, the same cannot be said of lawmaking independence, in either its substantive or
procedural manifestations." Id. In collapsing substantive and procedural rulemaking into
his category of lawmasking independence," Professor Redish then uses the commands of
the Rules of Decision Act to essentially trump those of the Rules Enabling Act, and to draw
arguable conclusions about the scope of independent judicial procedural rulemaking. Id
25. See Radish, supra note 21 at, 725 and discussion infra at notes 58-60. It is
somewhat interesting to compare Professor Redish's policy justifications for congressional
rulemaking authority to those advanced by Congress in support of the Civil Justice Reform
Act. See Mullenix, The Counter-Reformation,supra note 1, at 436-38.
26. See supra note 7 and Mullenix, The Counter-Reformation,supranote 1, at 382,42630; and Mullenix, UnconstitutionalRulemaking, sUpra note 1, at 1323-36.
27. See Mullenix, UnconstitutionalRulemaking, supra note 1, at 1316-23.
28. See, eg., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 1-8 (2d ed. 1994) (discussing
Article I with typically standard reference to the power of Congress to create lower
federal courts, institutional independence conferred by the life-tenure and compensation
clause, and the implications of the "case and controversy" requirement); PETER W. LOW &
JOHN CALVIN JEFFRIES, JR., EDERAL CouRTs AND THE LAW OF FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS
1-158 (2d ed. 1989) (analyzing federal judicial power in terms of concepts ofjudicial review,
the "case or controversy" requirement, the political question doctrine, and Article I courts);
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL CouRTs 27-100 (5th ad. 1994) (variously
analyzing the judicial power of federal courts in jurisdictional and "case or controversy"
terms).
29. See, e.g., Redish, supra note 21, at 700. "At first glance, at least to the issue of
judicial salary, the Compensation Clause appears to be as straightforward as virtually any
constitutional provision. Closer examination reveals, however, that interpretation of the
clause is fraught with potential confusion." Id. With due respect to Professor Radish, the
four issues he uses to illustrate that the Compensation Clause is "fraught with potential
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paper is engaged with parsing interpretive questions such as what the
Founding Fathers might have meant by a judge's "salary.' ° Can
anyone doubt that judges who are subject to threats, intimidation,
cajolery, bribes, political reprisal, or the like are not independent?
Problems relating to judicial independence in this institutional sense are
and ought to be the easiest to discern and resolve. It hardly seems
necessary to construct an elaborate constitutional framework and
interpretive methodology,' complete with originalist overtones,3 to
solve fundamental issues of Article HI institutional independence.3
Similarly, the basic tenets of "decisional" independence seem virtually
beyond cavil, and therefore largely uninteresting in any contemporary
debate over the nature and scope of independent judicial power.
Professor Redish sets forth the basic propositions of judicial independence in two thoroughly indisputable sentences: (1) 'The concept of
decisional independence implies the ability of the judge in a particular
case both to ascertain and interpret the governing legal principles and
to apply them to the facts of the case before her as she deems appropriate, free from external or extraneous influences and pressures that
might reasonably be thought to affect a decision; 3 and (2) "Examination of both established constitutional principles and fundamental
precepts of American political theory demonstrates that decisional

confusion" seem a gross caricature of constitutional nit-picking. Can anyone doubt that if
Congress acts in some retaliatory way to reduce the salaries or support of federal judges
this would not violate the Compensation Clause? Conversely, does anyone seriously believe
that the Compensation Clause prohibits diminution ofjudicial salaries by inflation? Surely
the Compensation Clause was not intended to deal with the global consequences of
capitalism, and it would take a decidedly conspiratorial mind to make the case that the
inflationary effects on judicial salaries were the result of an executive or legislative plot to
impair judicial independence. Along these lines, are we then destined for a separation-ofpowers case examining whether it is a violation of the life-tenure provision for members
of Congress to smoke cigars in an enclosed room with judges?
30. See id. at 702.
31. See, e.g., Redish, supra note 21, at 700-02, 706 (suggesting an interpretive
methodology analogizing from the concepts of laches and statutes of limitations and
discussing an "anti-discrimination" interpretive model).
32. See, e.g., id. at 700 (referring to concept of independent federal judiciary at time of
Constitution's framing); Id. at 700-01 (drafter's intent to insulate federal judiciary from
potential pressures); Id. at 702 (suggesting founding fathers probably did not contemplate
"support services" as part ofjudicil salaries); Id. at 704-05 (framers well acquainted with
problems of inflation).
33. Questions of institutional independence simply might be resolved by resort to
another less elaborate analogy, borrowed from sports: has (or will) the judge be induced to
throw the case?
34. See Redish, supra note 21, at 707. See supra note 33, on my proposed sports
analogy-which has application in the "decisional" sphere ofjudicial independence, as well.
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independence is the sine qua non of the federal judiciary's operation.'
Hence, if a presidential aide were to sidle-up to a federal judge, or a
legislator were to button-hole a federal judge, and subtly suggest that
the judge decide a pending case in a certain way, this would violate
-decisional independence."
Since almost everyone from Montesquieu forward holds these
propositions as virtually self-evident, Professor Redish's interesting
approach is to ground the concept of decisional independence in
constitutional due process and separation-of-powers doctrine. However,
he then unhelpfully concludes that it is often difficult to discern whether
a particular legislative or executive action violates decisional independence because of the "doctrinal uncertainty" surrounding judicial
interpretations of due process and separation-of-powers theory.'
Moreover, nowhere in the midst of this lengthy theoretical exegesis does
Professor Redish provide any hint as to what sort of executive or
legislative action (apart from blatantly egregious behavior) might breach
decisional independence and violate either due process or separation-ofpowers doctrine.37 And it is equally difficult to discern why Professor
Redish cabins his due process and separation-of-powers arguments to his
"decisional" realm, when it seems just as likely that the separation-ofpowers doctrine, at least, would play an important role in any debate
relating to the textual requirements of Article III, or federal courts in
their "lawmaking" or "counter-majoritarian" roles.
Professor Redish's third conceptual category encompasses his "countermajoritarian" principle, which in essence restates the fundamental
principle of constitutional law in Marbury v. Madison.'s In truth, this
category seems closely related to and overlapps with that of decisional
independence, and the broad propositions Professor Redish discusses

35. See Radish, supra note 21, at 707.
36. Id. With regard to the various paradigms of separation-of-powers, Professor Redish
accurately describes the analytical models and coirectly concludes that "it is simply
impossible to predict a decision on the constitutionality ofparticular legislative or executive
invasions of the judicial province when employing a functionalist standard." Id. at 712.
Cf Mullenix, UnconstitutionalRulemaking, supra note 1, at 1289-1314. Obviously, it is
not Professor Redish's fault that due process and separation-of-powers doctrine is in
doctrinal disarray, but the bottom line is that it is difficult to extract useful constitutional
guidelines from the doctrines since beth ultimately are fairly malleable.
37. Apart from the arm-bending sort of behavior contemplated by his first proposition,
the remainder of his discussion in this section does not seem directed at anything so

obvious as direct coercive or interventionist acts.
38. 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803). See Radish, supra note 21, at 714: 'That principle [the countermjoritarian principle] posits that the very majoritarian bodies intended to be limited by
the counter-majoritarian Constitution may not sit as the final arbiter of the constitutionality of their own actions, lest the Constitution be effectively rendered a dead letter." Id.
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seem fairly obvious and well-settled. Thus, it is manifestly evident that,
in order to maintain "counter-majoritarian" judicial independence,
Congress cannot "conscript[] the judiciary as an unwilling co-conspirator
"unduly
in what amounts to a legislative fraud on the public,
truncate the courts' power to resolve a case before it," or prescribe a
rule of decision in a case pending before the court.41 Or, more bluntly
summarized, Congress cannot tell federal judges how to decide cases, nor
restrain federal courts from holding congressional enactments unconstitutional.
In approximately two hundred years of constitutional history,
egregious assaults. on judicial power' 2 have been rare, although
compelling in their constitutional drama. Hence, for contemporary
debate, the more subtle issues involved in judicial "lawmaking independence" have taken center stage. And in attaching this categorical label
to this dimension of judicial power, Professor Redish unfairly skews the
theoretical debate.
II.

Professor Redish's rendition of the appropriate allocation of
procedural rulemaking suffers from problems of mischaracterization,

39. See Redish, supra note 21, at 715.
40. See id. at 716.
41. See id. at 718-21 (interpreting Klein). Professor Redish is correct that Klein is a
poor case from which to extract any broad constitutional theory about the scope and nature
of judicial power. Cf Mullenix, UnconstitutionalRulemaking, supra note 1, at 1318-19
(discussing the problematic Klein); Mullenix, The Counter-Reformation, supra note 1, at
411-18 (federal judges' invocation of Klein as precedent for judicial rulemaking authority
during the hearings on the Civil Justice Reform Act). See generally Paul M. Bator, et al.,
Note on the Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdictionof Federal Courts, in HART AND
WECHSLER's THE FEDERAL CouRTs AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 368-69 (3d ed. 1988) and
LAURaNCE H. TRIE, AMERrcAN CONSTTtIONAL LAW 50-51 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing

implications of Klein for theories of judicial power); Gordon G. Young, Congressional
Regulation of FederalCourts'Jurisdictionand Processes: United States v. Klein Revisited,
1981 Wis. L. REV. 1189 (1981). Professor Wright has characterized the Klein decision as
"cryptic," stating "there is much argument on how far it goes." See WRIGHT, THE LAW OF
FEDERAL COULTS, supra note 28, at 42 n.11.
42. See supra note 2, noting recent separation-of-powers cases. Probably the most
interesting cases. relating to judicial independence have been the rare, egregious frontal
assaults on institutional independence in such classic decisions as Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (presidential steel seizure case); United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936) (presidential authority to restrict arms
sales); and United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (invocation of executive privilege
to prevent disclosure of Nixon tapes). Although these cases are factually compelling, they
are not doctrinally challenging. See Mullenix, Unconstitutional Rulemaking, supra note
1, at 1298-1302.
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omission, and subtle but convenient distortions. Thus he often posits
sweeping generalizations that are true, but omits other equally valid
qualifications. For example, he states that one of the four basic
conclusions of American constitutional and political theory is that
"Congress may adopt constitutionally valid generalized rules of both
decision and process, and require the federal courts to enforce them."'
While this is true, he neglects to indicate that the Rules Enabling Act
confers a co-equal right of procedural rulemaking on the judiciary
Similarly, he states that "Congress has power under Article I to adopt
laws that provide substantive rules of decision in federal courts,"'
allowing this declaration also to shoulder-by unstated implication-a
procedural rulemaking power.*
Likewise, in applying separation-of-powers theory to the ability of
Congress to prescribe procedural rules for the federal courts, Professor
Redish endorses this concept "as long as the rules prescribed are of
general applicability and affect the behavior of citizens.'" This
basically is the same definitional shell-game that Congress used in its
legislative history justifying congressional procedural-rulemaking in the
Civil Justice Reform Act.' 7 In playing this game, Congress merely
declared procedural rules to be substantive in effect, thereby bringing
procedural rules within the legitimate ambit of its Article I substantive
lawmaking power. This same linguistic distortion permits Professor
Redish again to simply disregard the Rules Enabling Act, as well as to
magically transform procedural rules into substantive law.
Moreover, Professor Redish unreflectively buys wholesale the
interpretation of Hanna v. Plumer" that endorses congressional
authority to prescribe rules of procedure for the federal courts. 9

43. See Redish, supra note 21, at 712.
44. See id. at 715, concluding that [t]he unrepresentative, unaccountable federal
judiciary has no authority to ignore or supplant these rules of decision, short of a finding
of unconstitutionality." Id.
45. See also id. at 725. Professor Redish characterizes judicial power as inherently
characterized "by the adjudication of individualized, live disputes' whereas the
"promulgation offree-standing rules of general applicability does not fit within this model."
Id. By defining terms in this fashion, Professor Radish gets to control the outcome of the
debate, using a straw man that transforms procedural rulemaking into a substantive law

function.
46. See id. at 723-24.
47. See Mullenix, Unconstitutional Rulemaking, supra note 1, at 1333-34; see also
Mullenix, The Counter.Reformation,supra note 1, at 379-82, 432-34, 437.
48. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
49. See Redish, supra note 21, at 723-24. He does support this rationale with the
Article I enumerated power to create inferior federal courts and "auxiliary power under the
Necessary and Proper Clause": two rather weak constitutional arguments.
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Apparently Professor Redish also agrees with the cursory citation to
Hanna in the legislative history of the Civil Justice Reform Acte that
Congress used to justify it's enactment of a massive scheme of procedural rules. As indicated above, not only is this gloss on the Erie-SibbachHanna case line irritating, but it fundamentally misses the point or is
disingenuous. These cases are not a resounding affirmation of congressional procedural rulemaking authority, but rather ofjudicial rulemaking authority as it is properly exercised.
Professor Redish further distorts the rulemaking debate by arguing
that the judicial branch cannot lay claim to an exclusive procedural
rulemaking authority. This is a straw-man argument because no
academic commentator or judicial member has yet made such a claim.
On the contrary, only Congress has arrogantly asserted such exclusive
right for itself.51 Yet, Professor Redish sets up this straw-man and
then attacks it with vengeance. He inverts the allocation debate by
casting the rulemaking issue in terms of the functionalist separation-ofpowers model:
...One would inquire whether an otherwise legitimate exercise of
the legislative power should be invalidated because it unduly invades
the province of a coordinate branch. The only way this question could
be answered in the affirmative is by concluding that the task of
promulgating rules of procedure is so intimately bound up in the
performance of judicial function that the courts could not effectively
exercise the "judicial power" without retaining exclusive authority over
procedural rulemakin It is difficult to see how such a conclusion
could be reached, in light of the long and established history of

congressionalinvolvement in the rulemaking process.52

Not only has no one asserted an exclusive rulemaking authority for
the federal judiciary, but Professor Redish's invocation of the "long and
established history of congressional involvement in the rulemaking
process"' compels a conclusion completely opposite from the one he
intimates. Indeed, the fifty-year history of procedural rulemaking-as
a practical matter-stands as a stunning monument to congressional
50. See S. Rep. No. 416, supra note 17, at 9-10, reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6812.
See also Mullenix, The Counter-Reformation,supra note 1, at 426-28 (discussing Senate
Report's discussion of Hanna v. Plumer and Sibbach case line).
51. In so doing, Professor Redish seems to be engaging in projecting the sins of
Congress onto the judiciary.
52. See Redish, supra note 21, at 724 (emphasis added). In the very next sentence
Professor Redish cites Hanna for the proposition that "the Supreme Court's power to
promulgate procedural rules has traditionally been rationalized as a congressional
delegation of legislative power to the Court." Id (citing Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471-72).
53. Id.
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apathy, disinterest, and total non-involvement in the procedural
rulemaking process. To convert this long, historical reality into some
pattern of congressional involvement with the procedural rulemaking
process is ludicrous, if not disingenuous. Only with the proposal of the
Federal Rules of Evidence" in 1972' may one even find initial stirrings of congressional interest in judicial branch rulemaking. Moreover,
this interest in procedural rulemaking would not be revived until
Congress decided to meddle with federal process-serving in the early
1980s.6
At least twice more, Professor Redish repetitively harps on the
illegitimacy of judicial claims to an exclusive power over procedural7
rulemaking, without ever indicating who is making such a claim.1
Further attacking this straw-man, he uses a "functionalist" separationof-powers argument to defend Congress's "legitimate and significant
interests in the procedures and operations of the federal courts."' This
medley of justifications is a collection of pretty weak stuff. Professor
Redish asks us to believe that the judiciary cannot have an exclusive
right to procedural rulemaking because Congress's substantive legislative programs are "inescapably intertwined with the procedural
efficiency of the federal courts,5 9 which in turn effects the federal
budget. Thus, he grandly concludes that "the level of Congress's
legitimate interest in the choice of procedural rules that govern federal

54. See generally FSD. R. EVID.
55. Congressional involvement in promulgation of the Federal Rules of Evidence was
itself highly controversial, and the Senate legislative history to the Civil Justice Reform
Act eliminated references to this "precedent! in support of congressional rulemaking
authority. See Mullenix, UnconstitutionalRulemaking, supra note I at 431.
56. See Mullenix, Hope Over Experience, supra note 4, at 844-46. See also Mullenix,
The Counter-Reformation,supra note 1, at 431 n.220.
57. See Redish, supra note 21, at 724-25. At the very least, Congress has always
retained ultimate authority under the Rules Enabling Act to overrule specific rules
promulgated by the Court. Such a power would of course be unacceptable if the judicial
power over rulemaking were thought to be "exclusive." No one either believes or claims
that the judicial power over procedural rulemaking is exclusive, so Professor Redish's
hypothesized fear of a diminution of congressional authority is off-target. See also id. at
725. "Even if one were to conclude that procedural rulemaking does fall within the judicial
province, that judicial authority is exclusive does not automatically follow." Id. Professor
Redish cites my article on UnconstitutionalRulemaking for the first half of this sentence,
but he has no support at all for the second half. I most certainly have not made a claim
for exclusive judicial authority over procedural rulemaking, nor do I know of anyone who
has.
58. See id. at 725.
59. Id.
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court operation is virtually as intense as that of the federal courts
themselves.' °
This is somewhat silly, as the entire cost of the federal judiciary is a
microscopic drop in the federal budgetary pail. With regard to the
allocation of rulemaking power, Professor Redish fails to advance either
his own coherent theory or to rebut existing argument. Rather, he tilts
at windmills of his own creation. If Professor Redish has a strong
constitutional or statutory argument relating to the relative allocation
of procedural rulemaking authority that includes discussion of the Rules
Enabling Act, then he should make it.
IV.
In a similar vein, Professor Redish's analysis of the constitutionality
of the 1990 Civil Justice Reform Act is an amalgam of partial truths,
selective omissions,"' and straw-men arguments. In essence, he
advances three points: (1) that Congress has the right to impliedly
repeal the Rules Enabling Act; (2) that the Civil Justice Reform Act does
not "constrain the federal judiciary's discretion to fashion procedural
rules in any meaningful way;" and (3) that Congress has a "preemptive"
procedural rulemaking authority.'
Professor Redish's implied repeal argument essentially is a red
herring, because no one has asserted that Congress lacks the power to
directly or impliedly repeal its own previous enactments.63 That
Congress may exercise a repeal power is true, but not exactly the point.
When a federal statute delineates interbranch power - such as the
Rules Enabling Act - and the effect of a congressional repeal is to
constitutionally diminish or eviscerate another branch's independence,

60. Id.
61. This section of Professor Redish discussion largely addresses my contention that
Congress' enactment of this legislation represents a de facto overruling of the Rules
Enabling Act, and therefore the CJRA arguably is unconstitutional. Further, as a policy
matter, I have argued that this reallocation ofprocedural rulemaking to Congress or other
amateur legislative bodies is disturbing and unwise. See Mulleniz, The CounterReformation of Procedural Justice, supra note 1, at 382-85, 432-34, and Mullenix,
UnconstitutionalRulemaking, supra note 1, at 1286-87, 1323-38.
62. See Redish, supra note 21, at 726.
63. Id.; cf Mullenix, UnconstitutionalRulemaking,supra note 1, at 1287; Mullenix, The
Counter-Reformation, supra note 1, at 389, 392. It is difficult, therefore, to refute his
conclusion that "at least as a constitutional matter the possibility that the subsequently
enacted Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 may undermine the dictates of the Rules Enabling
Act is of no real significance.' He repeats this conclusion again a couple of sentences later:
"no legal or constitutional bar to such congressional action exists." Redish, supra note 21,
at 726.
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then Professor Redish (and the Congress for that matter) owes some
better explanation than a hornbook rule. Stating that Congress can
repeal whatever it wants without reference to the nature and content of
the statute being repealed is simply too easy. Thus, the implied repeal
of the Rules Enabling Act that was effectuated through enactment of the
CJRA was no ordinary congressional repeal of a previously enacted
substantive statute. In enacting the CJRA, Congress was not merely
rethinking prior substantive law and replacing an ill-begotten substantive decision with a new majoritarian viewpoint. Rather, the CJRA
represented Congress's tacit declaration that henceforth it can enact
procedural rules whenever it feels like it, the Rules Enabling Act
notwithstanding. Congress simply reallocated procedural rulemaking
authority exclusively unto itself, a power that historically always has
been shared with the judiciary.
Moreover, Professor Redish is somewhat equivocal about the particular
implied repeal of the Rules Enabling Act that Congress accomplished
with passage of the CJRA. Thus, he acknowledges that the Supreme
Court "has held that 'implied repeals are to be heavily disfavored.' 4
Having conceded this holding, he fails to elaborate which implied repeals
are so objectionable as to not pass constitutional muster. If ever an
auspicious candidate for "disfavored repeal" existed, surely it must be
the Rules Enabling Act. One suspects Professor Redish believes this,
because he then cryptically allows that "the fact that the Civil Justice
Reform Act undermines so, venerable an enactment as the Rules
Enabling Act simply adds to the problems of social policy to which the
former act is thought to give rise."* This concession, of course, is the
nub of the matter. It seems dubious (and constitutionally dangerous)
that Congress, in the interests of its own social policy agenda, may go
around wresting interbranch power to accomplish its legislative ends.
Professor Redish's second defense of Congress's constitutional
authority to enact the CJRA is based on his conclusion that the statute
actually does not constrain the federal judiciary's ability to fashion
procedural rules. Thus, he notes that under the CJRA the civilian
advisory committees "d[id] not actually possess rulemaking power;"
and that the district courts retained the final ability to accept or reject
recommendations ,by those committees; s' as well as rulemaking
authority under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 83.'

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

See Redish, supra note 21, at 726.
Id
See id. at 726 n.140, 727.
Id. at 727.
1&
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While these assertions are literally true, they represent an unrealistic
vision of the rulemaking process that actually occurred in implementing
the CJRA. Professor Redish simply accepts Congress's brilliant
legislative coup in the CJRA-and its simultaneous usurpation of
procedural rulemaking-labeling this venture substantive lawmaking
and then recasting it as an exercise of judicial procedural rulemaking
prerogative. Thus, the crucial distinction lies in de facto and de jure
power.
Under the CJRA, each federal district court did retain the de jure
power to approve or disapprove advisory committee programs, plans, or
rules. This provision helped conform the CJRA to usual judicial
rulemaking process. In practice, however, the local advisory committees
engaged in de facto procedural rulemaking. Moreover, Congress was the
real de facto procedural rulemaker in that it essentially instructed the
advisory committees exactly how to structure CJRA reports and plans.
Congress mandated that the advisory groups institute procedural reform
and detailed exactly what that procedural reform should entail.
CJRA advisory committee members did not sit like Rawlsian solons,
drafting new local procedural rules from behind a veil of ignorance or
from some consensual original position. Nor did the members divine
new procedural rules from the jurisprudential ether. Rather, the
advisory groups obediently carried out a textually-elaborate scheme of
procedural reforms that Congress wanted, focusing extensively on an
array of pre-trial procedures, including discovery, alternative dispute
resolution, and case management techniques. Ninety-four federal
district courts did not produce Civil Justice Reform plans that mimic one
another in highly similar sets of lock-step reforms by coincidence.
The district courts' power to approve or disapprove the CJRA plans
amounted to a formalism insulating the Act from blatant unconstitutionality. While some district courts may have tinkered with proposed
advisory committee recommendations, most district courts signed onto
the plans without effectively engaging in the procedural rulemaking
process. In essence, most district courts were simply presented with a
civil justice reform plan fete accompli carrying the inertia of such laborintensive collaborative efforts.
Furthermore, one does not have "to assume that the creation of the
advisory committees somehow [I as a practical matter confine[d] or
inhibit[ed] district court rulemaking power"" to support a finding of
unconstitutionality, as Professor Redish suggests. The CJRA did not
"confine" or "inhibit" district court rulemaking in the formal sense;

69. Id.
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rather, the Act simply cut the judges out of the usual rulemaking
process altogether. The CJRA conferred on the federal courts a de jure
wand with which to beknight the efforts of congressionally created and
directed amateur rulemaking groups.
Professor Redish's third argument is predicated on a congressional
"pre-emptive" power to apparently do whatever it wants." Thus, he
completely deflects the rather inconvenient problem of Congress'
unilateral declaration of an exclusive procedural rulemaking authority,
recasting the allocation problem entirely.71 Several problems exist with
this improbable defense of the CJRA. Tb begin, the fact that Congress
has declared an exclusive procedural rulemaking authority does not miss
the point: it is the point. Professor Redish should not avoid this
embarrassing declaration. He should deal with it directly and inform us
whether he believes Congress was right in so declaring.
Second, Professor Redish sets forth a completely novel principle of
interbranch relations-legislative preemption-for which he has no
support and no citations. Preemption doctrine in its most usual sense
applies to problems of federalism, the relationship of the federal
government to the states. Here Professor Redish imports some notion
of preemption theory to bolster his views of congressional procedural
rulemaking authority. This preemption doctrine is odd indeed, given
that it permits one co-equal federal branch to usurp the prerogatives of
another.
Further, under Professor's Redish view, while the federal courts may
fashion procedural rules "as a matter of common law development, 72
he seriously questions "the [constitutional] power of an Article HI court

70. See id. at 727-28. Redish suggests that even assuming the advisory groups were
impermissibly delegated formal rulemaking power, "the conclusion that the Act breached
separation of powers by unduly invading the judicial province would be most tenuous." Id.
at 727.
71. See id. at 727-28:
But such reasoning misses the point. The questions is not whether congressional
rulemaking power is exclusive, but rather whether it is preemptive. Absent
preemptive congressional legislation, it is not only appropriate but essential for
federal courts, as a matter of common law development, to fashion procedural
principles to govern their internal operation. It no way logically follows, however,
that Congress lacks constitutional authority to enact generally applicable
procedural rules that take precedence over such judicially developed common law
rules ...

such congressional action ...

falls within both the constitutional

restriction of congressional authority to the exercise of legislative power and the
substantive scope of Congress' powers under Article I.
72. Id.
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to promulgate generalized rules of procedure." 3 This claim is extraordinary in light of the Rules Enabling Act and more than fifty years of
judicial rulemaking, none of which has been accomplished as a matter
of common law development, but rather through statutory prerogative.
Moreover, Congress' so-called preemptive right to promulgate procedural
rules, under its Article I legislative power, similarly ignores the
rulemaking allocation in the Rules Enabling Act, conveniently collapsing
the notion of procedural rulemaking into substantive lawmaking.
V.
Professor Redish's final foray into defending the CJRA is to examine
whether it violates the non-delegation doctrine. Here his discussion
again seems unrealistic and muddled.
He makes two simple points. First, he suggests that the nondelegation doctrine might be violated by a congressional delegation to an
advisory body pertaining to the internal operation of the judiciary,
74 One
absent "more detailed standards of direction in the delegation."
can only view this statement with extreme irony, since the major
problem with the CJRA was not an absence of direction to the advisory
groups, but rather an excess of such detail. The advisory groups most
certainly were not unguided discretionary missiles. Thus, in the same
fashion that the CJRA seems constitutionally irreproachable because of
the courts' ultimate de jure power over CJRA plans, the Act seems
virtually unassailable on delegation grounds.
Second, Professor Redish asserts an unfathomable syllogism to support
his notion that the CJRA may raise a non-delegation challenge.7' No
one disputes that federal courts may not fashion substantive law under
the Rules of Decision Act"' or that they must follow state substantive
law under the dictates of Erie.7 But the conclusion that the CJRA

73. Id. at 727 n.151.
74. Id. at 728.
75. See id. at 729.
76. See generally, 28 U.S.C. 1652.
77. See Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); see generally JURISDICTION
§§ 4503-04 (1982 and Supplement to CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR H. MILLER &
EDWARD COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE). See also Professor Redish has a
very circumscribed view of the import of the Rules of Decision Act for the theory ofjudicial
power. Cf Louise Weinberg, Federal Common Law, 83 Nw. U.L. REV. 805 (1989)

(discussing federal court ability to fashion federal common law) and Louise Weinberg, The
CuriousNotion that the Rules of Decision Act Blocks Supreme FederalCommon Law, 83
Nw. U.L. REV. 860 (1989) (criticizing Professor Redish's narrow interpretation of the Rules
of Decision Act) with Martin H. Redish, FederalCommon Law, PoliticalLegitimacy, and
the InterpretativeProcess: An "Institutionalist'Perspective, 83 Nw. U.L. REV. 761 (1989)
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violates the non-delegation doctrine does not flow from this syllogism,
unless one believes that procedural rules are substantive. 78
VI.
Professor Redish is unconvincing not because he clearly misstates the
law, but because he evades grappling with the central statutory source
for the allocation of rulemaking authority, the Rules Enabling Act.
While he is willing to suggest what that legislation permits to Congress,
he never once indicates what that legislation also grants to the judiciary
He simply ignores a congressionally enacted statute that allocates a
shared rulemaking power and clearly delineates substantive lawmaking
to Congress and procedural rulemaking to the judiciary Thus, he
diverts attention from the centrality of the Rules Enabling Act in the
rulemaking debate and needlessly confuses the issue with recourse to
the Rules of Decision Act.
The Rules of Decision Act is not at all concerned with the proper
allocation of procedural rulemaking authority, as demonstrated in Erie.
Erie turned in large part on the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
significance of the Rules of Decision Act in a federalist system of
government. 9 Hanna v.Plumer drew its justification not from the
Rules of Decision Act, but instead from the Rules Enabling Act.o
Thus, Erie doctrine has two distinct branches: a Rules of Decision Act
branch that instructs what substantive law federal courts must apply
and a Rules Enabling Act branch that helps determine what procedural
rules federal courts legitimately may promulgate and apply.81 Professor Redish ignores the import of the Hannabranch of Eriejurisprudence,

(narrowly interpreting Rules of Decision Act as limiting judicial lawmaking function) and
Martin H. Redish, FederalCommon Law and American PoliticalTheory: A Response to
Professor Weinberg, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 853 (1989).
78. In essence, Professor Redish's concluding paragraph embodies the following illogical
syllogism: (1) The judiciary cannot fashion substantive common law principles. (2) The
CJRA vests, by delegation, procedural rulemaking authority in advisory committees. (3)
Therefore, the CJRA is subject to a non-delegation challenge.
79. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 71.
80. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 463-64.
81. See, e.g., John HartEly, The IrrepressibleMyth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REv. 693,698
(1974): Thus, where there is no relevant Federal Rule of Civil Procedure or other Rule
promulgated pursuant to the Enabling Act and the federal rule in issue is therefore wholly
judge-made, whether state or federal law should be applied is controlled by the Rules of
Decision Act, the statute construed in Erie and York. Where the matter in issue is covered
by a Federal Rule, however, the Enabling Act-and not the Rules of Decision Act itself or
the line of cases construing it--constitutes the relevant standard.
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choosing instead to caricature that decision as validating congressional
rulemaking authority.
Moreover, with regard to judicial power, Professor Redish completely
omits any discussion of inherent power of the courts, because he does not
recognize the doctrine of inherent power as it applies to the federal
courts.' Although Professor Redish does not like this doctrine, it
nonetheless exists and enjoys a substantial tradition in the federal
courts, recently endorsed by the Supreme Court as alegitimate basis for
the sanctioning power of federal judges.'
82. See REDISH, TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER, supra note 21.
Notwithstanding Professor Redish's disregard for the concept of inherent court power, the
problem of inherent court power has led to a lively debate about the existence and scope
of such power. See generally Jeffrey Jackson, Judicial Independence, Adequate Court
Funding,and Inherent Judicial Powers, 52 MD. L. REV. 217 (1993); Michael M. Martin,
Inherent JudicialPower: Flexibility Congress Did Not Write into the Federal Rules of
Evidence, 57 TE. L. REv. 167 (1979). Professor Stephen B. Burbank disputes that a theory
of inherent judicial power can support a claim for judicial rulemaking authority. See
Stephen B. Burbank, Comment, Sanctions in the Proposed Amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure: Some Questions About Power, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 997, 1004-11
(1983).
83. See Chambers v. Nasco, 501 U.S. 32 (1991); see also United States v. Hudson &
Goodwin Inc., 11 U.S. 32, 34 (1812) (inherent powers of the federal courts are those which
are "necessary to the exercise of all othere); Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626 (1962)
(inherent court power to sanction for abusive litigation practices); but see Kokkonen v.
Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 114 S. Ct. 1673 (1994) (federal courts lack either inherent
power or ancillary jurisdiction for continuing supervisory authority over settlement
agreements). See generally Thomas M. Alpert, The Inherent Power of the Courts to
Regulate the Practiceof Law: An HistoricalAnalysis, 32 BUFF. L. REV. 525 (1983); Neil H.
Cogan, The Inherent Power and Due Process Models in Conflict: Sanctions in the Fifth
Circuit,42 SW. L.J. 1011 (1989); Stephen K Christiansen, Inherent SanctioningPower in
the Federal Courts After Chambers u. Nasco, 4 B.Y.U. L. REv. 1209 (1992); James S.
DeGraw, Note, Rule 53, InherentPowers, and InstitutionalReform: The Lack of Limits on
Special Masters, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 800 (1991); Neal Devins & Steven J. Mulroy, Judicial
Vigilantism: Inherent Judicial Authority to Appoint Contempt Prosecutorsin Young v.
United States ex rel Vuitton Et Fils S.A., 76 KY. L.J. 861 (1987-88); Hugh Macy Favor, Jr.,
Comment, Federal Courts Sanctioning Represented Parties Using Rule 11 and Their
InherentPower: You Can Run But You CannotHide, 21 CAP. U. L. REV. 225 (1992); Joseph
J. Janatka, Note, The Inherent Power: An Obscure Doctrine Confronts Due Process, 65
WASH. U. L.Q. 429 (1987); J.D. Page & Doug Sigel, The Inherent and Express Powers of
Courts to Sanction, 31 S. TEx. L. REV. 43 (1990); Goodloe Partee, Note, ProcedureSanctions-FederalProceduralRules Do Not DisplaceInherent Powers of Court to Award
Attorney's Fees for Bad Faith Conduct, 14 U. AK. LrrrLE ROCK L.J. 107 (1991); David A.
Rammelt, Note, "InherentPower"and Rule 16: How Far Can A Federal Court Push the
Litigant Towards Settlement, 65 IND. L.J. 965 (1990); Alexander B. Rotbart, Sanctions and
the InherentPower: The Supreme Court Expands the AmericanRule's Bad FaithException
for Fee Shifting, 16 NOvA L. REv. 1527 (1992); S.D. Shuler, Chambers v. Nasco, Inc.:
Moving Beyond Rule 11 into the Unchartered Territory of Courts Inherent Power to
Sanction, 66 TUL. L. REv. 591 (1991); Leroy J. Tornquist, The Active Judge in Pretrial

754

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

The Supreme Court seems to think that some concept of inherent
power of the federal courts exists, without which the federal courts
would cease to exist as courts." While the focus of Professor Redish's
paper concentrates on the concept of judicial independence, an equally
valid approach is to reframe the question and ask what attributes
constitute the essence of judicial power. Certainly Professor Redish's
concepts of institutional and decisional independence are attributes of
judicial power. But judicial power also includes the ability to compel
people to appear, to sanction for contempt, and to conduct internal
affairs of the judiciary through procedural rulemaking.
The Hannaline of cases certainly recognizes the concept of procedural
"housekeeping" rules that, pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act, are
appropriately within the purview of judicial rulemaking precisely
because they may be fairly characterized as non-substantive and address
the internal judicial processing of federal cases. That portion of the
Rules Enabling Act, endorsed in Hanna, which approves judicial
procedural rulemaking essentially is a statutory recognition of the
inherent power of federal courts to promulgate internal rules of
procedure as an attribute of judicial power.
VII.
As to the policy issues that underlie the rulemaking debate,
apparently the only way to justify "majoritarian" procedural rulemaking
is to declare procedural rules to be substantive. This conclusion would
indeed justify Professor Redish's majoritarian preferences.
But if there is an independent concept of procedural rules, then it is
unclear why procedural rulemaking should-as a policy matter-be
allocated to the legislative branch, and there are good reasons why it
should not. If a central normative value of an independent judiciary is
neutrality, then neutrality ought to be guarded not only in the courts'
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decisional function, but in the procedural rulemaking process as well.
Indeed, the judiciary's decisional neutrality may be fatally impaired to
the extent that procedural rulemaking preceding decision-making is
itself non-neutral.
To the extent that the judicial rulemaking process is transformed into
a legislative one, so-called "majoritarian preferences" (meaning interest
group preferences) will embellish the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The aesthetic underlying enactment of the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure was imbued, in part, with an ethos of neutral-rulemaking.
While Professor Redish still believes in the norm of neutral judging
(derived from the concept of due process), his theory ofjudicial independence abandons the norm of judicial rulemaking.
Professor Redish recognizes a counter-majoritarian role for the
judiciary in decision-making, yet ironically he does not recognize a
counter-majoritarian role for the judiciary in procedural rulemaking. In
the end one must ask: of what avail is neutral decision-making in the
absence of neutral rulemaking?

